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settlement of land titles. He is meeting with remarkable success,
having won all cases interested in recently.
Mr. V. Y. Moore, one of the most brilliant men that ever grad-
uated from law in this University, and now located at Madisonville;
Ky., 'ha's "rcetitly iwit nominated by the Republicans for Congress
in his disttft.
S. B. Dhinan, '14, is now located at Barbourville, Ky., and doing
well.
The staff for the Kentucky Law Journal has been selected for
next year. Mr. J. V. -hamberlain,the present Associate Editor, will
be ditof-n-Chief, and Mr. F. H. Ricketson, Jr., will be Business-
Manager. 'the remainder of the staff will be selected later.
IS THE PLEA OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT FOR MISDEMEAN-
ORS JfUSTIFIABLE IN KENTUCKY?
This article, written by J. T. Gooch, a Senior in the Law Department
of University of Kentucky, was awarded first prize in the contest
conducted by Baldwin Law Book Company of Louisville.
The plea of autrefois acquit involves many questions of mixed law
and fact. The purpose of the plea is to prevent any person from being
persecuted in the courts. That-is, if "A" has been indicted for any
offense and brought to trial in a-court of proper jurisdiction and
acquitted, he cannot be arraigned in court again for that particular
offense. The principle of the law is, that is better fof ninety and
nine perspns to go unpunished than for one innocent person to, be
punished. The same principle is embodied in Sec. 13, of the Constitu-
tion of Kentucky, which reads as follows: -"No person shall for the
same offense be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
The question of, "the same offense or identical crime," has per-
plexed our courts and has afforded much ground for contention
among lawyers. The disagreement as to what constitutes "the same
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offense or identical crimes," has evolved certain tests by which the
question may be decided or determined.
Therefore the question naturally follows, what is the test of
"identical offenses"? Chitty's Blackstone 4th B. 336, says: "The
general rule is somewhat vaguely stated to be that the plea of former
conviction or acquittal must be upon the prosecution for the jdentical
offense or crime." Also Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 328,
gives the rules to determine identities to be as follows: "Several rules
have been laid down by the authorities for determinipg whether
crimes are identical; one test is to ascertain whether the facts alleged
in the second indictment, would, if given in evidence, have warranted
a conviction in the first, and, if this is the case, when the crimes are
assumed to be identical. Another test is to inquire whether the two
crimes are not the same, whether they grow out of the same trans-
action. The safest rule is that the offenses must be precisely the same,
or they must be of the same nature, or the same species, so that the
evidence which proves the one would-prove the other."
Complications may arise as to the interpretation and application
of these rules, i. e. whether they apply only to a second indictment of
which one has been acquitted, or to an offense identical and simul-
taneous with one of which a person has been acquitted. To illustrate:
Suppose "A," in an altercation with "B" and "C," who were acting in
concert and making an attack upon him, shot and killed "B" and "C,"
but with separate shots. Suppose also that "A" was charged with
and indicted for killing them on separate indictments. Suppore he was
tried and acquitted for the killing of "B." The question is, can "A"
plead former jeopardy or outrefois acquit in the trial for the killing
of "C"? The courts seem to hold the contrary. They look upon the
killing of "B" and "C," even under such circumstances as being two
offenses.
The test of identities seems to be held to .apply only in cases
where there has been a second indictment for the same offense, of
which the accused has been convicted or acquitted, and not to apply
to the same kind of indictments, charging a person with two separate
offenses, although committed simultaneously, by two separate aid
distinct' acts, being of the same species and prompted by the same
cause as shown by the following citations. Chitty's Blackstone Vol.
II., p. 271, when speaking of special pleas in bar said: "First, the
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plea of autrefois acquit, or former acquittal is grounded on this
universal maxim of the Common Law of England, that no man is to
be brought into jeopardy of life more than once for the same offense.
And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is once
found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any
court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such
an acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."
Further, the plea of autrefois acquit is held to apply to the
second indictment in Rex. v. Taylor 5 Dit. R. 521, 3B, and C. 62, in
which the court held, "A plea of autrefois acquit cannot be pleaded
unless the facts charged in the second indictment, would, if true,
have sustained the first." Also in Rex v. Sheen, 2C, p. 635, the court
said, "And if the prisoner could have been legally acquitted on the
first indictment upon any evidence that might have been introduced,
his acquittal on that indictment may be successfully pleaded to the
second indictment, and it is immaterial whether the proper evidence
was introduced at the trial of the first indictment or not."
Now let us examine in what cases the special plea of autrefois
acquit may be pleaded. Art. 5, of the Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States which reads as follows, "Nor shall any person
be subjected for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb," and Sec. 13, of the Constitution of Kentucky, supra, has
been interpreted to properly apply to treason and felonies and not to
misdemeanors. Yet, Bishop's New Crim. Law, Vol. I., p. 596, Para-
graph 99o , reads, "Practically and wisely, the courts by an equitable
interpretation apply it (the rule of autrefois acquit or former
former jeopardy) to indictable offenses, including misdemeanors; but
not to actions for the recovery of penalties because these are not
criminal proceedings, nor to applications for sureties of the peace.
There is, however, an apparent tendency in some of the courts to hold
the doctrine more strictly in higher crimes, especially those punishable
with death, than in ordinary misdemeanors."
The national government and all the states, so far as the writer
of this article has been able to ascertain, hold that the plea of
autrefois acquit may be pleaded in all crimes of treason and felony.
There may be exceptions as to misdemeanors. However, since the
lawyers of Kentucky are interested in Kentucky decisions the
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remainder of this article will be, in alarge measure, devoted to the
plea of outrefois acquit as regards misdemeanors in Kentucky.
In 18oi, the General Assembly passed an act as follows, Littels
Statutes of Kentucky, Vol. II., p. 478, "If any riot, rout or unlawful
assembly of the people, or breach of the peace, be made or committed
in any part of this commonwealth, a justice of the peace, together
with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, or the constable where
such riot, assembly or rout, or breach of the peace shall be made,
shall come with the power of the county, if need be to arrest them,
* * * and shall inquire of the said riot, or rout, or assembly
of the people or breach of the peace, and award against those whom
they find guilty thereof, due pains, by amercement and imprisonment."
Later it was found that the above section was substantially the
same as an act of Virginia, passed in 1786, which'was practically the
same as an act which had been passed by the English Parliament, with
the exception that the Virginia act went no further than riots, routs
and unlawful assemblies, while the Kentucky act of i8oi, unfortun-
ately added breach of the peace. Unfortunate, it is held, because it
afforded a ready means of escape from punishment. And why?
Because a breach of the peace can hardly be considered as a definable,
substantive, independent offense.
To avoid this predicament, an act was passed by the General
Assembly, in 18o2, Littel's Statutes, Vol. 3, P. 55, to repeal Section 32
of the act of i8oi, but the General Assembly made a mistake and
repealed Section 22 of the same act which dealt altogether with
forgery. The mistake was discovered and corrected in 18o4, Littel's
Statutes, Vol. 3, P. 241.
The act of 18o2, provided, "That if any riot, rout, etc., be made
or committed in any part of this commonwealth, a justice of the
peace, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county or
constable where such riot, etc. * * shall be made, * * * and
it shall be the duty of the sheriff, or under-sheriff or constable to
summons twelve jurors to attend at the time, and the place directed by
the justice aforesaid, who after being sworn by the said justice, shall
proceed to punish each offender by a fine not exceeding twenty
dollars, and in default of the payment thereof, shall be imprisoned
not exceeding twenty days."
The passage of the above act brought before the courts the
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question whether or not a person could be tried onf' a charge of assault
and battery, after being, tried on the charge of a breach of the
peace, as prescribed by the statute. That is, where the assault and
battery constituted the breach of the peace. In the case of the Comm.
V, Miller, V. Dana- p. 320, the court. held, "And therefore, as if
appears, 'ii. this- case :hbt only that Miller had been proceeded against
fairly and without collusive purpose, tinder the act of 18o2, for breach
of the pe'ac!e committed in the assault and battery, for which he is
now indictd, but thlt he had actually paid the fine adjudged against
him, and thiis has bben once punished-he is not legally liable to
punishment upon the indictment for the same assault and battery.-
The same rule was held to -apbly, II, Metcilfe, p. i, in answer to the
qttestion, " Ts a' fine fof the -ech- of the peace, assessed under ihe
stAttite for suppressing ribls, etc.,- * <* . legal bar to a subsequent
indictment 'agaihst-the saine party, for an assault and battery?" Thus
the plea of afit-efois';fcquit as regards the statute of I8o2, was settled-
by the courts.
But it is clear after the passage of the act of I8O2, making the
statutory mode of prosecution before justices by warrant, repealed the
common law mode of prosecution by indictment. Also it abolished the
punishment provided by the common law. In 73 Kentucky Reports,
P. 558; the court said: "The effect of this was- to give justices of the
peace exclusive jurisdiction of prosecution for breaches of the peace,
and to make that offense no longer indictable." To remedy this defect
in the law, an act was passed in i8o9, Littel's Statutes, Vol. 4, P. 8o,
Sec. ii, providing: "Be it further enacted that the common law in
relation to riots, etc., * 4: shall be and the same hereby declared
to be in full force, and that any person or persons guilty of any of the
aforesaid offenses-may be indicted and punished at common law as
heretofore, any law to the contrary not withstanding: Provided that
this act shall be so construed as not to subject any person or persons
to be twice punished for the same offense." Therefore the plea of
autrefois acquit may be pleaded on indictment for misdemeanor at
common law.
Thus, since the plea of autrefois acquit is permitted to be applied
to 'misde-meanors' in Kentucky, the question arises, Why is it p'er-
mitted to apply? If the plea of autrefois acquit, properly belong, t0
felonus' and treason,- how -rriay the coufit§ jtigtify themselves in con-
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struing it to apply to misdemeanors? The answer to these questions
may be finely drawn but it is based upon justice and reason.
Since the granting of Magna Charta, I215, A. D., by King John,
the English Law has embodied the principle, that the greatest pre-
caution must be taken by the courts, in dealing with persons _accused
of crime. And why? Because the law presumes, every man to be
innocent until he is proved guilty.
To prove the innocence or guilt of any person accused, of crime,
he must be arraigned in a court of proper jurisdiction, an issue must
be reached, and an acquittal or conviction must be-rendered,,either by
the court or a properly selected jury.
The English Law has such high regard for justice and places
such careful restrictions on the -officers .of the law, as regards the
rights and privileges of persons, that the courts of Kentucky' have
fcund:it-proper and in keeping with the spirit and justice of the law,
to.pezmit the plea of autrefios acquit, in cases of misdemeanors. Thus
after a fair and impartial trial has been held a court of proper juris-
diction, the spirit of the law forbids a second trial upon an indictment
for that particular offense.
Therefore, since the law is based .upon justice, from Alpha to
Omega, and since it places such careful restrictions upon the officers of
the.law, as .regards. the rights and privileges of persons, the courts of
Kehtucky acted properly and in keeping with the spirit and justice
of the law, to permit the plea of autrefois acquit, to apply in cases
of misdemeanors.
TRIAL BY JURY
This article was awarded second prize in the contest conducted by
Baldwin Law Company.
By W. J. Kallbreir, Junior Law Student.
The greatest bulwark in the administration of justice against the
power and aggression of a single man is the "Trial by Jury." The
exact origin of this institution is not known, however, writers have
traced it back to various sources: It is a settled fact today that all
the early countries had some form of jury. trial. We- find that it was
